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In passing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA")
Congress significantly expanded federal subject matter jurisdiction
over class action lawsuits.' CAFA amended the diversity statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1332, by creating subsection (d), which gives federal courts
original jurisdiction over class actions where: (1) any member of the
plaintiff class is a citizen of a different state than any defendant; (2)
the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 exclusive of interests
and costs; and (3) the class includes at least one hundred members.2
Because defendants will most likely be the party to assert federal
jurisdiction, 3 removal is the avenue by which many of the newly
permissible cases will reach federal court. Consequently, Congress
created 28 U.S.C. § 1453, a more liberal removal statute that eases
the requirements to remove class actions to federal court.4
Part A of this Article looks at choice of forum and removal
historically. It explores the occasion for federal jurisdiction prior to
CAFA, and looks at the opportunities for abuse and "gamesmanship"
on either side. It discusses how this perceived abuse influenced
Congress' motive to enact CAFA. Parts B and C describe the current
procedural avenues for class action removal and appeal of a remand
order under CAFA, evaluating ambiguous provisions and practical
implications. Part D considers additional CAFA-related procedural
issues, including CAFA's effective date and applicability, the burden
of proof with respect to federal subject matter jurisdiction, discovery
issues that have arisen as a side effect, and the applicability of the
new removal provision to class action suits that do not meet the
CAFA-enacted requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Part E
concludes that despite its drafting errors and imperfections, CAFA
successfully expands federal jurisdiction and creates no fatal
1. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
3. Defendants are thought to prefer federal court primarily because of the
perception that federal courts are reluctant to certify class actions. See
JEFFREY 1. LANG & DEBRA TODRES, SEVERAL FUNNY THINGS HAPPENED ON
THE WAY TO THE CLASS ACTION FORUM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY
AFFECT THE CHOICE OF FORUM 1N CLASS ACT1ON LITIGATION 1, 3 5 (1997)
(chronicling federal circuit court decisions that either rejected class
certification or decertified settlement classes following district court approval
of class action settlements).
4. See Class Action Fairness Act § 5.
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ambiguity that cannot be adequately addressed through litigation.
A. Understanding Class Action Forum Selection
A class action is a representative suit on behalf of a group of
people similarly situated.5 They aim to promote judicial economy
and efficiency, protect defendants from inconsistent obligations,
protect the interests of absentees, provide access to judicial relief for
small claimants, and enhance the means for private attorney-general
suits to deter wrongdoing. 6 Despite the seemingly straightforward
definition and objectives, to say that class actions are controversial
"is to understate the obvious." 7  The controversy partially arises
because class suits can have far-reaching effects to bring about
institutional and governmental change and can force large companies
to disgorge significant profits.
8
Over the last fifteen years, class actions have garnered wide
public attention, which has both educated and misled the public
about the class action litigation device. 9 The attention has generally
5. 1 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 1:1 (4th ed. 2005).
6. Id. § 1:6; see also FED. R. CTV. P. 23 advisory committee's note
(explaining that class actions can "achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated").
7. Susan T. Spence, Looking Back.. In a Collective Way, 11 BuS. LAW
TODAY 21, 24 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2002-07-
08/spence.html.
8. CONTE & NEWBURG, supra note 5, § 1: 1.
9. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of
Class Actions, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 337, 340 41 (arguing that the Supreme
Court's return to rules formalism obscures the development of a "due process-
based analysis for the law of representative actions"); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff's Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (asserting that the agency costs inherent in
"entrepreneurial litigation" produce inefficiencies that can only be addressed
by a free market for legal claims, in which attorneys may purchase outright the
claims of class members); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals,
2003 U. Cl. LEGAL F. 71, 77-83 (objecting that class action litigation is a
lawyer-driven hunt for bounty); Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts Messy
Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228, 1231 (1995) (discussing the "low state of
ethical practice in class actions" and the "sell-out lawyers who, for millions in
fees, are willing to sign away the rights of tens of thousands of faceless and
lawyerless class members"). See generally Alon Harel & Alex Stein,
Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel, 22 YALE
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been negative, and class actions have come under attack by a variety
of think-tanks, interest groups, and lobbyists. 10  In its report
accompanying CAFA, the Senate concluded that "[b]y now, there
should be little debate about the numerous problems with our current
class action system." '1 Yet, despite this dramatic conclusion, other
scholarship suggests that the problems and abuses of class actions
have been overstated, and the debate continues.
1 2
Forum shopping is one the most prominent issues in the
debate. 13 On the one hand, forum shopping is an inherent attribute of
a multi-state judicial system.14  Given the differences in state
substantive law, the various rules of jurisdiction, venue, conflicts,
and transfers, counsel may engage in complex strategic moves in an
attempt to favorably affect the outcome of his case.1 5 Nonetheless,
L. & POL'Y REV. 69 (2004) (focusing on auctioning the lead counsel position
in class actions).
10. These advocacy groups uniformly cite to "class action abuse" as the
need for reform. See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, http://www
.atra.org (last visted Feb. 3, 2006); Legal Reform Now, http://www
.legalreformnow.com/index.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2006); Center for Legal
Policy at the Manhattan Institute, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/
clp.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
11. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
5. Sens. Biden, Brownback, Coburn, Cornyn, DeWine, Durbin, Feingold,
Feinstein, Graham, Grassley, Hatch, Kennedy, Kohl, Kyl, Leahy, Schumer,
Sessions, and Specter sat on the Senate Judiciary Committee at the time of
enactment. See id.
12. See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, INCENTIVE
AWARDS TO CLASS ACTION PLATNTIFFS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 6 (Dec. 7,
2005) (finding little evidence of systematic abuse in incentive awards to
representative plaintiffs); THOMAS E. W1LLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN,
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS' CHO1CE OF FORUM 1N CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION 40, 54 (2005) (concluding that state and federal courts do
not differ greatly in how they resolve class actions).
13. See WILLGTNG & WHEATMAN, supra note 12, at I ("Attorneys' choice
of whether to file or litigate a class action in a state or federal forum has been
of great concern to policymakers who are considering how to regulate class
action litigation.").
14. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International,
63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 554 (1989) ("Even before International Shoe Co. v.
Washington heralded the age of long-arm jurisdiction, plaintiffs could take
advantage of a multiplicity of available fora." (footnote omitted)).
15. See id. 556 ("[V]enue often determines the size of a verdict, because the
generosity ofjuries varies from one location to another.... [T]he outcome of
a lawsuit may depend on whether an action is brought in state or federal
court.").
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despite its popularity on both sides, the term "forum shopping" still
carries a pejorative connotation.16 Critics object to what they deem
excessive forum shopping, alleging that it causes inconsistent, and
thus unfair, outcomes.' 7  The inconsistency is a result of the wide
variation in state class action law, both procedurally and
substantively. 18  In fact, the class action does not exist as a
procedural device in some states.' 9  Additionally, certain
jurisdictions have a "plaintiff-friendly" reputation, which attracts
lawsuits from around the nation. 2 Because most class actions prior
to CAFA were adjudicated in state court,21 and there was such
variation among state forums, large disparities existed among
judgments and settlements.
2 2
This disparity problem became prevalent only recently because,
historically, federal court was a more popular venue for class actions
than state court.2 3 Class action procedure was largely developed in
24federal court, and parties viewed federal courts as more
advantageous because federal courts were better equipped to handle
class actions, had more experience in dealing with class suits than
their state counterparts, and amended Rule 23 was viewed as more
16. See Juenger, supra note 14, at 553.
17. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, at 6
(2004), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2O04
.pdf; CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, TRIAL LAWYERS INC.: A REPORT ON THE
LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA 2003, at 8 (2003), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/triallawyersinc.pdf; John H. Beisner &
Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action Magnet Courts: The Allure Intensifies,
Clv. JUST. REP., July 2002, at 9, available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/pdf/cjr 05.pdf; American Legislative Exchange Counsel, Class
Action Reform, http://www.alec.org/2/2/talking-points/class-action-reform
.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
18. See SECTION OF LITIG., AM. BAR ASS'N, SURVEY OF STATE CLASS
ACTION LAW 2004 (Thomas R. Grande ed., 2004) [hereinafter SURVEY OF
STATE CLASS ACT1ON LAW] (chronicling the differences in class action law by
state).
19. For example, Mississippi has no class action litigation device. See
Boone v. Citigroup, Inc., 416 F.3d 382, 393 (5th Cir. 2005).
20. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 17, at 6.
21. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3,5.
22. Id.
23. CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 13:22.
24. See Spence, supra note 7.
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liberal than state court rules.25
Today, however, plaintiffs have come to view those courts as
less hospitable forums for class actions, and a series of unfavorable
federal court decisions encouraged plaintiffs to move to state court.26
Throughout the 1990s, federal circuit courts repeatedly rejected class
certification, 27 and plaintiffs thus began to perceive federal courts as
hostile towards class actions. 28 Commentators also began to identify
various factors29 and strategic considerations 30 that militated in favor
of filing in state court. The perception that state court judges gave
more favorable treatment to class actions further bolstered the move
25. See id.
26. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996)
(decertifying a nationwide tobacco litigation class because the district court (I)
failed to properly consider the variations in state law on matters of fraud and
negligence, and (2) failed to properly consider manageability problems); In re
Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a nationwide
product liability class action because the district court did not properly
consider the individual factual issues raised by each class member's claim as
well as variations in state law on matters such as negligence); Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (decertifying a nationwide
settlement class, noting that "we cannot conceive of how any class of this
magnitude could be certified"); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293
(7th Cir. 1995) (decertifying a nationwide product liability class action because
that district court failed to consider the variations in state law, the existence of
individual issues, and the problems of manageability); In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995)
(decertifying a settlement class and holding that a settlement class should not
be subject to a relaxed review).
28. See LANG & TODRES, supra note 3, at 1.
29. Factors that favor filing a class action in state court include: supportive
public opinion; primarily state-law issues; and where administration or
distribution to class members may be facilitated by state or local consumer
protection or other agencies. STUART T. ROSSMAN & DANIEL A. EDELMAN,
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS: A PRACTICAL LITIGATION GUIDE 23 (5th ed.
2002).
30. Plaintiffs can obtain several strategic advantages by filing multiple
state-court class actions: plaintiffs can take progressive discovery in multiple
forums, using discovery in one case (perhaps in a forum with more liberal
discovery rules) to augment discovery in other cases; plaintiffs can file in state
courts that traditionally have been more sympathetic to plaintiff interests; the
opportunities to seek certification of a number of statewide class actions in the
state courts may be more advantageous than a single, all-or-nothing
opportunity to certify a nationwide class in federal court. LANG & TODRES,
supra note 3, at 7-8.
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to state court.3'
Jurisprudentially, scholars suggested that there were also more
fundamental reasons why state forums were the appropriate forum to
hear class actions based on state law.
32 Because the Erie doctrine33
requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state law, federal
courts cannot create or advance state law; only state courts can create
binding precedent in their law.34 There is also concern that federal
courts should not allocate their resources to cases that must be
controlled by state law.
35
Practically, the move to state court was possible because of the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts.36  The Court held that state courts may, with certain due
process constraints, adjudicate claims of non-resident class
members. 37 The ruling thus allowed state courts to hear multi-state
and nationwide class actions with binding effect. The force of these
judgments increased dramatically when the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Matsushita v. Epstein,38 which established that class
settlements reached in state courts have preclusive effect over even
federal claims that were not litigated in the forum state.
39
The number of multi-state class actions being adjudicated in
state court significantly increased beginning in 1985, possibly
because of the perceived practical advantages, the theoretical support
for state-court adjudication, or other reasons. 40 The increase was, of
course, a product of plaintiffs' reluctance to file in federal court, but
it was equally a product of the defendants' difficulty in removing the
3 1. Plaintiffs may perceive state court as more favorable because "most
state court judges are elected and thus are motivated to make decisions that are
politically popular." See Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions and Other Multi-
Party Litigation in a Nutshell, in NON-FEDERAL QUESTION CLASS ACTIONS
2002: PROSECUTION & DEFENSE STRATEGIES 331, 341 (2002).
32. See, e.g., CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 5, at § 13:22; Mark C.
Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts., Constitutional and Practical
Advantages of the State Forum over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215, 253 57 (1994).
33. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
34. See id. at 79.
35. Weber, supra note 32, at 217.
36. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
37. Id. at 822 23.
38. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
39. Id. at 369.
40. See SURVEY OF STATE CLASS ACTION LAW, supra note 18, at ix.
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action under the former system.41 Both prior and subsequent to
CAFA, a defendant has only two bases to remove a state court class
action to federal court: the existence of either a federal question or
42diversity. In both instances, removal jurisdiction is premised on the
existence of original jurisdiction.43
Prior to CAFA, federal original jurisdiction existed over class
actions only where the plaintiff pleaded a federal cause of action or
where there was complete diversity, and thus it was easy for the
plaintiff to defeat federal jurisdiction.45 To avoid federal question
jurisdiction, for example, a consumer class action practice guide
counsels: "[D]o not plead a federal credit discrimination, credit
reporting, truth in lending, or odometer statute. Instead, plead a state
counterpart., 46  The practice guide next describes how to "short-
circuit" diversity jurisdiction prior to CAFA: "Make sure that at least
one named plaintiff and one defendant reside in the same state.
Bring the action in a jurisdiction retaining Zahn. [47] Do not plead a
claim under a fee-shifting statute that specifies that attorney fees go
to the plaintiffs attorney." 48 Because of their distrust of federal
courts, plaintiffs attorneys would often engage in these tactics when
drafting the class action complaint.49
The general removal scheme also allowed plaintiffs to easily
avoid federal jurisdiction because of the technical limitations it
placed on removal. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) imposes a
one-year time limitation on removing class actions. 50  To avoid
federal jurisdiction, plaintiffs could initially name a non-diverse
41. See ROSSMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 29, at 26 27.
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
43. See id.
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), amended by 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
45. See ROSSMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 29, at 26 27.
46. Id.
47. In Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), the Supreme Court
held that where only named plaintiffs met the jurisdictional amount, the
unnamed plaintiffs that fell short could not participate in the class action. Id. at
301. The Supreme Court, however, recently overruled Zahn in Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005). For a more detailed
discussion of Exxon's impact on class actions, see the discussion infra Part E.4.
48. ROSSMAN & EDELMAN, supra note 29, at 27.
49. See id.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
1002
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"friendly" defendant to the complaint, whom they would then
dismiss one year and one day after filing the action.5' Additional
tactics are identified below in the discussion on CAFA's removal
scheme and its changes to the former system.
52
The former class action system that permitted suits to remain in
state court would not have required modification were it not for the
perceived abuse and injustice that was occurring in state courts.
53
The Senate found that a "key reason" for the problems in class action
litigation was that "most class actions are currently adjudicated in
state courts." 54 This meant, according to the Senate, that governing
rules were applied inconsistently and in such a way that contravened
basic fairness and due process considerations.55 Furthermore, state
judicial supervision of litigation procedures and proposed settlements
was "inadequate," resulting in settlements that offered little
56meaningful recovery to claimants. Finally, class action judgments
have nationwide ramifications, so often a state court would overturn
well-established laws and policies of other jurisdictions.
57
Numerous tort-reform interest groups fueled misgivings about
state-court adjudication. For example, the American Tort Reform
Association (ATRA) 58 published a report documenting so-called
51. See generally Yosef Rothstein, Ask Not for Whom the Bell Tolls: How
Federal Courts Have Ignored the Knock on the Forum Selection Door Since
Congress Amended Section 1446(b), 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 186
87 (noting that plaintiffs may "manipulate" state court proceedings to avoid
federal jurisdiction).
52. See infra Part B.
53. See WILLGING & WHEATMAN, supra note 12, at 2 ("The call for
legislative change reflects fundamental assumptions.., that the driving force
in choice-of-forum decisions is the expected difference in class certification
and case outcome based on how state and federal judges apply substantive
laws and procedural rules.").
54. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
5.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. ATRA is a District of Columbia nonprofit organization, comprised of
other nonprofit organizations, small and large companies, as well as state and
national trade, business and professional associations. AM. TORT REFORM
FOUND., supra note 17, at 4 5. ATRA named the following as the 2005
Judicial Hellholes: Rio Grande Valley and Gulf Coast, Texas; Cook County,
Illinois; West Virginia; Madison County, Illinois; St. Clair County, Illinois;
and South Florida. See ATRA, http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/ (last
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"Judicial Hellholes"-jurisdictions that ATRA perceived as
consistently anti-defendant. 59 The stated purposes of the report were:
"(1) to identify areas of the country where the scales of justice are
radically out of balance; and (2) to illustrate how accuracy,
efficiency and predictability can benefit the American civil justice
system."6° The report described judicial abuses in the following
areas: forum shopping, novel legal theories, discovery abuse,
consolidation & joinder, improper class certification, unfair case
scheduling, excessive damages, junk science, uneven application of
evidentiary rules, jury instructions, trial lawyer contributions, and
cozy relations among jurists, lawyers, and governmental officials.
61
The report concludes that because of these abuses, the named
jurisdictions have developed a "well-deserved plaintiff-friendly
reputation," which "attracts lawsuits from around the nation."
62
Thus, the perceived abuses occurring at the state level, coupled
with the difficulty of removing the cases to federal court, encouraged
some groups to clamor for reform. 63 So prompted, Congress enacted
CAFA.64
B. Current Removal Procedure Under CAFA
CAFA's heart is its expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction,
which is primarily accomplished by easing the citizenship and
amount in controversy requirements with respect to class actions.
65
In addition to what it believed to be prohibitive substantive
requirements, Congress wished to eliminate procedural requirements
that enabled lawyers "to 'game' the procedural rules and keep
nationwide or multi-state class actions in state courts." 66 Congress
determined that the removal system in place under 28 U.S.C. §§
visited Mar. 26, 2006).
59. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 14, at 4.
60. Id.
61. Id. at8 9.
62. Id. at 6.
63. See, e.g., AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 17, at 43.
64. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
65. See Cameron Fredman, Plaintiffs' Paradise Lost: Diversity of
Citizenship and Amount in Controversy Under the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, 39 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1025 (2006).
66. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
1004
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1441 and 1446 created the opportunity for such gamesmanship, and
thus a significant portion of CAFA's provisions is dedicated to
establishing new requirements and procedures for removal.67
Section 5 of the Act creates a new removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1453, which governs the removal of only class actions.68 The statute
provides that the general removal provisions in place under 28
U.S.C. § 1446 continue to apply to class actions, except where they
are inconsistent with the provisions of the new statute. 69 Practically,
this means that a defendant must still file a notice of removal
containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal
within thirty days after receiving a copy of the complaint, 70 and
removal is still premised on the existence of original jurisdiction.71
Even if the action was not removable at the time of filing, the
defendant may also remove if the case later becomes removable.
72
The modifications to existing removal procedures serve to ease
other technical limitations that are in place under the general removal
scheme. 73 Specifically, the statute makes three major modifications
to general removal provisions, each of which will be analyzed in
turn: (1) it eliminates the one-year time limit on removing cases, (2)
it makes a defendant's citizenship in the forum state irrelevant, and
74(3) it allows for any defendant to remove.
1. Eliminates One-Year Time Limit
The newly enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) provides that "[a] class
action may be removed to a district court of the United States in
accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation under
section 1446(b) shall not apply). 75  This provision explicitly
eliminates the one-year limitation on removing cases to federal
court, 76 and requires only that the defendant file papers seeking
67. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1453).
68. Id.
69. § 1453(b).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(b) (2006).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006).
72. § 1446(b).
73. See infra Part B. 1 3.
74. See § 5, 28 U.S.C. § 1453.
75. § 1453(b).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61,
69 (1996) ("No case ... may be removed from state to federal court based on
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LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:995
removal within thirty days of the action becoming removable,
regardless of the potential advanced stage of the state court
litigation.77
In eliminating the one-year limitation, Congress intended to
prevent attorneys from engaging in the type of gaming that occurred
under the general removal scheme, such as plaintiffs dismissing non-
diverse parties one year and one day after filing suit.71 Often
plaintiffs would simply include non-diverse defendants in the initial
complaint thereby preventing removal, even though the plaintiffs
never actually intended to fully pursue the action against the non-
diverse defendants. 79  The elimination of the deadline prevents
plaintiffs from engaging in these tactics by allowing the defendant to
remove at any point that action becomes removable.
On the other hand, elimination of the one-year deadline gives
rise to the same problems that prompted its enactment:
The [one-year deadline] addresses problems that arise from
a change of parties as an action progresses toward trial in
state court. The elimination of parties may create for the
first time a party alignment that supports diversity
jurisdiction. Under section 1446(b), removal is possible
whenever this event occurs, so long as the change of parties
was voluntary as to the plaintiff. Settlement with a
diversity-destroying defendant on the eve of trial, for
example, may permit the remaining defendants to remove.
Removal late in the proceedings may result in substantial
delay and disruption.
80
According to the new statute, a defendant may seek removal to
federal court after a class certification order, dismissal decision,
summary judgment opinion, directed verdict, or even a jury verdict
"from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is
or has become removable." 8' Because CAFA is so new, there have
diversity of citizenship 'more than 1 year after commencement of the
action.'").
77. § 1453(b).
78. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 50 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
47.
79. Id.
80. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 72 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N
5982, 6033-34.
81. Gregory P. Joseph, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: A
1006
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not yet been any cases that fall under the extreme scenarios described
above, but the text of the statute does not appear to give a federal
court judge any discretion to decline jurisdiction (unless, of course,
the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are not met). 2
Congress thus made a trade-off in enacting CAFA: it wanted to
block plaintiffs' attempts to game the system by adding non-diverse
defendants, but, by expanding removal, it also opened the possibility
that late-stage removal could disrupt and delay actions. Although the
extreme scenarios described above seem unlikely, the concern over
delay and disruption should outweigh the concern over plaintiffs
taking advantage of the one-year deadline, given the other
modifications to class-action diversity jurisdiction that curtail
plaintiffs' gaming ability. For example, the most common tactic by
which plaintiffs would take advantage of the one-year deadline was
dismissing a non-diverse defendant one year and one day after
commencement of the action.8 3 But because CAFA eliminates the
complete-diversity requirement, this tactic is no longer available
even without the elimination of the one-year limitation because the
case would have been removable from the start. Elimination of the
one-year deadline thus seems unnecessary.
2. Makes Defendants' Citizenship in Forum State Irrelevant
Section 1453 further provides that a class action may be
removed "without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of the
State in which the action is brought., 84  Under the traditional
removal scheme's "forum defendant rule," 85 a defendant may not
remove an otherwise removable case if it is filed in the defendant's
own state because, in theory, such a defendant has no need to assert
diversity jurisdiction. 86 Diversity jurisdiction is based, in part, on the
goal of protecting the nonresident litigant from local prejudice. 87 If
Preliminary Analysis, 20 Toxics L. REP. 264, 270 (2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b)).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2006) (indicating that a federal judge has
discretion to decline jurisdiction in an action only where a claim is joined with
a non-removable claim and state law predominates).
83. See, e.g., Owen v. Kroger, Co., 936 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
84. § 1441(b).
85. Hurley v. Motor Coach Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 2000).
86. See § 1441 (b).
87. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
October 2006] 1007
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:995
the plaintiff files the case in the defendant's own state, then the
nonresident litigant would be the plaintiff and there would be no
need to protect the defendant from local prejudice. Accordingly, 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) removes a defendant's option to do so in this
scenario.a8
The Senate believed, however, that imposing this same
restriction on removal of class actions would subvert the drafters'
intent because it could perpetuate the complete diversity rule, which
CAFA purports to eliminate. 89 A plaintiff could defeat removal
jurisdiction by naming both in-state and out-of-state defendants to
the complaint. 90 Even absent the requirement of complete diversity,
the defendants would not be able to remove because the forum
defendant rule would prohibit it.91  As the example illustrates,
plaintiffs can easily take advantage of the rule to avoid federal
jurisdiction. This type of "gaming" is precisely what offended
Congress. 92 Accordingly, Congress eliminated this limitation with
respect to removal of class actions.
93
3. Allows Any Defendant to Remove
Without the Consent of Other Defendants
Finally, § 1453 modifies existing removal requirements by
providing that class actions "may be removed by any defendant
without the consent of all defendants." 94  Congress adopted this
provision to "prevent a plaintiffs' attorney from recruiting a
HARV. L. REV. 483, 492-93 (quoting James Madison saying, "It may happen
that a strong prejudice may arise in some states, against the citizens of others,
who may have claims against them.") (citing 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN
ITE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 391 (1828)).
88. See § 1441 (b).
89. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 48-49 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,45-46.
90. Id.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) provides that the action is removable "only if none
of the parties... served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought." § 144 1(b) (emphasis added).
92. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2006).
94. § 1453(b). Under the general removal scheme of §§ 1441 and 1446,
case law requires the consent of all parties to remove an action. See, e.g.,
Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986); Mitchell v.
Kentucky-American Water Co., 178 F.R.D. 140, 142 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
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'friendly' defendant (for example, a local retailer) who could refuse
to join in a removal to federal court and thereby thwart the legitimate
efforts of the primary corporate defendant to seek a federal forum in
which to litigate the pending claims." 95 The modification, of course,
harms those legitimate defendants who do not want to remove, but it
nevertheless fulfills Congress' intent to expand federal jurisdiction.
C. Appellate Review of Remand Orders
CAFA also modifies the existing removal scheme by expanding
appellate jurisdiction. Under the general removal system, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) largely precludes appellate review of remand orders.
96
CAFA-enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), however, provides that an order
remanding a class action to state court is reviewable by appeal at the
appellate court's discretion.
97
1. Procedural Requirements of Appellate Review
The remand review provision attempts to balance the interest in
developing a body of appellate law interpreting the legislation with
the interest of speedy resolution.98 The statute reaches this balance
by imposing time limits on the appellate process. 99 The parties must
file notice of appeal within seven days after entry of a remand
order, 100 and the appeals court must issue a final decision on appeal
within sixty days. 0 1 The provision permits one ten-day extension
"for good cause shown" if an extension is "in the interests of
justice." 102 If the appellate court does not issue a final judgment on
95. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 49 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
46.
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006) ("An order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which
it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.").
97. § 1453(c).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. The statute actually provides the opposite: application for appeal must
be made "not less than 7 days after entry of the order." § 1453(c)(1) (emphasis
added). But courts have assumed this to be a typographical error, and have
applied the statute as if it required the application to be made within seven
days. See infra Part C.2.
101. See § 1453(c).
102. Id. The court may grant a longer extension if all parties agree to one.
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the appeal before the end of the period, the appeal is deemed
denied. 1
03
2. Timing
The text of CAFA provides that an application for appeal of a
remand order must be made "not less than 7 days after entry of the
order."' 10 4 According to the literal words of the statute, a party who
filed an appeal "less than" seven days after the district court entered
its remand order would have appealed too early. This timing
provision appears to be a drafting error as the Senate Report
accompanying CAFA states that "parties must file a notice of appeal
within seven days after entry of a remand order."'1 5 And despite the
text's language to the contrary, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits applied
the statute as if it read "within seven days."
10 6
In Pritchett, the Tenth Circuit held that the statute contains a
"typographical error" and must be read to say "'not more than' seven
days after entry of the remand order."'10 7 The court noted that the
plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the "rare
cases in which a 'literal application of the statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters."'1 8 In
such cases, the drafters' intention, rather than the strict language,
controls. 10 9  In applying this presumption to CAFA, the court
concluded that:
[g]iven Congress' stated intent to impose time limits on
appeals of class action remand orders and the limited
availability of appeals prior to the statute's enactment, we
can think of no plausible reason why the text of the Act
would instead impose a seven-day waiting period followed
Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 49 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
46 (emphasis added); GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF
2005: WITH COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS BY GEORGENE M. VAIRO OF THE
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE BOARD OF EDITORS 39-41 (2005).
106. Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 2005).
107. Id. at 1093 n.2 (emphasis added).
108. Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242
(1989)).
109. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 242.
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by a limitless window for appeal.1 10
Thus, the court interpreted the statute as if it read that a party
must file notice of appeal within seven days of the remand order.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held in Amalgamated Transit Union
v. Laidlaw11' that the notice of appeal must be filed not more than
seven days after the remand order. 112  The court analogized the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) to that found in § 1292(b), which
governs interlocutory decisions, finding that Congress intended to
create an appeal that is within the court of appeals' discretion.
113
The language of the statute requires filing an "'application,' the same
word used in § 1292(b), not a 'notice of appeal,' and further required
that the application be 'made to the court of appeals,' as is the case
with a § 1292(b) petition under [Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure] 5, whereas a notice of appeal is filed in the district
court."114 The court concluded that given CAFA's legislative history
and the similarities in statutory language, Congress intended to
mirror the procedures for taking an appeal pursuant to § 1292(b)."
15
Accordingly, the court held that a party seeking to appeal under §
1453(c)(1) must comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 5.116
While it is likely that the circuits will agree that the timing
provision is a clear drafting error, courts have not widely addressed
the issue. The safest thing to do at this point is to file the application
for appeal on exactly the seventh day. This is precisely what the
defendant did in Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc. 117  The court in
Cheaptickets was grateful that it was "not called upon to speculate
whether it is appropriate or even permissible for this Court to correct
Congress's 'typographical' mistake in this case."'1 18 Because the
defendant filed its appeal on exactly the seventh day following the
110. Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1093 n.2.
111. 435 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006).
112. Id. at 1146.
113. See id. at 1145.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 425 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2005).
118. Id. at 685 (citing In re Century Cleaning Servs., Inc., 195 F.3d 1053,
1063-64 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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remand order, it was "not less than" seven days afterwards.
11 9
Additionally, even under the Tenth Circuit's "corrected" reading of
§ 1453 (c), the defendant's appeal was timely because it was filed "not
more than" seven days after the remand order.
120
The best solution would be for Congress to correct its own
drafting error to ensure the result it intended. Even absent this
correction, the courts will likely apply the statute as if it read "within
seven days."
D. Other Procedural Issues
Because of its expansiveness and complexity, CAFA is
expectedly producing other technical and procedural questions
requiring litigation. Specifically, issues have arisen concerning
CAFA's effective date, the burden of proof with respect to federal
court subject matter jurisdiction, the need to conduct discovery, and
the applicability of § 1453 to class actions that do not meet the
requirements of § 1332(d).
1. Effective Date
The most immediate question for practitioners is whether CAFA
applies to a particular case. Section 9 of CAFA provides that "this
Act shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date of
enactment of this Act." 12 1 CAFA's date of enactment was February
18, 2005.122 The term "commence" is not defined in CAFA.
123
Therefore, parties have broadly litigated its meaning, and it is one of
the few CAFA issues to produce an informative body of case law to
date.
124
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 4.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding
that an action commences on the date it is first filed in state court); Knudsen v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
purportedly significant change to class definition did not commence a new
action for purposes of CAFA); Pritchett v. Office Depot, Inc., 420 F.3d 1090,
1094 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that an action commenced when it was initially
filed in state court, not when it was removed to federal court); Morgan v. Am.
Int'l Group, Inc., 2005 WL 2172001 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2005) (holding that
"'in removal cases, "commencement" is governed by the law of the state in
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a. Date of "commencement"
Those circuits that have addressed issues relating to CAFA's
effective date have agreed that an action is "commenced" when it is
filed in state court, rather than when it is removed to federal court.
125
This decision nullifies defendants' initial attempts to remove based
on the argument that the action was commenced on the date it was
removed. 126
Many of the first decisions to interpret CAFA involved exactly
this question: whether CAFA would permit the removal of a case
initiated in state court before the legislation became law, but not
removed to federal court until after February 18, 2005.127
Defendants in these cases argued that "commenced" meant
"commenced in federal court," that is, the date of removal, not the
date of filing. 128 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the class
action commenced just once, when it was initially filed in state
court. 129
For example, in Natale v. Pfizer, the plaintiffs filed their action
in state court on February 11, 2005, one week prior to CAFA's
enactment. 130 Pfizer filed a notice of removal in the District Court
on March 25, 2005, after CAFA's enactment, but still within thirty
days of plaintiffs' filing.1 31  Pfizer contended that the action was
132commenced on the date it was removed, March 25, 2005. Based
on this interpretation, CAFA would apply to the case, because CAFA
which the action originated"') (quoting In re Expedia Hotel Taxes & Fees
Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 904, 905 (W.D. Wash. 2005)).
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Natale, 424 F.3d at 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (dismissing defendant's
argument that "the actions were commenced on the date they were removed");
Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1094 (dismissing defendant's argument that the action
commenced in federal court as of the date of removal); In re Expedia Hotel,
377 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (dismissing defendant's argument that "the action
commenced either on the date that the state court consolidated the three
original suits or on the date that Defendant removed the case").
127. See Knudsen, 411 F.3d at 806; Natale, 424 F.3d at 44; Pritchett, 420
F.3d at 1095; In re Expedia Hotel, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 905-06.
128. Knudsen, 411 F.3d at 805; Natale, 424 F.3d at 43; Pritchett, 420 F.3d at
1090; In re Expedia Hotel, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
129. Knudsen, 411 F.3d at 805; Natale, 424 F.3d at 43; Pritchett, 420 F.3d at
1090; In re Expedia Hotel, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
130. Natale, 424 F.3d at 44.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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governs "any civil action commenced on or after" February 18,
2005.133 On the other hand, if the action commenced when plaintiffs
filed in state court, CAFA would be inapplicable.
The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, along with several
district courts within other circuits, have all rejected the defendants'
reading of the word "commenced," and have agreed that an action is
commenced when it is filed in state court. 34 These decisions are
consistent with a body of pre-CAFA case law establishing that
"[t]raditionally, a cause of action is commenced when it is first
brought in an appropriate court."'1 35 When a matter is removed to
federal court, it is not usually viewed as recommenced, nor as a new
cause of action. 136 Case law has further established that in removal
cases, "'commencement' is governed by the law of the state in which
the action originated."' 
37
Traditional rules of statutory construction also supported the
interpretation of "commencement" as the date of filing in state court.
The federal courts have tended to narrowly construe statutes that
confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts, particularly removal
statutes. 38 In Pritchett v. Office Depot, the Tenth Circuit noted that
"if there is an ambiguity as to whether [CAFA] confers federal
jurisdiction over this case, we are compelled to adopt a reasonable,
133. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 4.
134. See supra note 124.
135. Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1094 (citing FED. R. CTV. P. 3); see also Kieffer v.
Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 398, 401 (D. Md. 1958) ("[W]e do not
usually think of an action as having been commenced in a district court by
removal."); 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (3d ed. 1998) (noting
that removal jurisdiction is unique, because it allows a federal court to hear a
claim over which it has no original subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, to
adjudicate a suit that could never have commenced there).
136. See Kieffer, 167 F. Supp. at 401.
137. Provenza v. Yamaha Motor Co., 295 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (D. Nev.
2003); accord O'Brien v. Powerforce, 939 F. Supp. 774, 777 (D. Haw. 1995);
Perez v. Gen. Packer, 790 F. Supp. 1464, 1469 (C.D. Cal. 1992); Coman v.
Int'l Playtex, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Greer v.
Skilcraft, 704 F. Supp. 1570, 1582-83 (N.D. Ala. 1989); Dravo Corp. v. White
Consol. Indus. Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1136, 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1985); see also
Rezendes v. Dow Corning Co., 717 F. Supp. 1435, 1437 (E.D. Cal. 1989)
(using California law to determine when an action commenced).
138. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941);
United States ex re. King v. Hillcrest Health Ctr., 264 F.3d 1271, 1280 (10th
Cir. 2001).
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narrow construction. Here, we find Plaintiff's interpretation of the
word 'commenced' in the Act to be such a construction."
'1 39
Finally, the courts apply a presumption against a statute's
retroactivity absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary.140
Far from a clear intention in favor of retroactivity, CAFA's
legislative history suggests an intention against retroactivity. When
CAFA was originally introduced in the House, the removal provision
applied both to cases commenced on or after the enactment date and
to cases in which a class certification order was entered on or after
the enactment date. 141 In contrast, neither the Senate version of the
bill nor the final statute passed by both houses of Congress provided
for removal of actions certified on or after the enactment date.
142
The Senate version and the final statute provided only for application
of CAFA to civil actions commenced on or after the date of the
enactment.1
43
This development led the Tenth Circuit to conclude, "[iut is thus
clear that Congress initially started out with broader language that
could have included a number of then-pending lawsuits in state
courts. By excising the House provision, Congress signaled an intent
to narrow the removal provisions of the Act to exclude currently
pending suits."' 144 This legislative intent further dissuaded the court
from giving effect to the removal date as the commencement date,
because, by doing so, the court would be enforcing the statute
retroactively. 145 The Seventh Circuit, per Judge Easterbrook, noted
finally "that § 9 of the new Act [governing its effective date and
applicability] must be taken seriously. Deconstructionist tactics do
not permit its evasion.''
146
b. Re-commencing the action by amending the complaint
The above line of decisions does not, however, preclude entirely
139. Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1095.
140. Id. at 1095 n.3 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., Inc., 511 U.S. 244,
280 (1994)).
141. See H.R. 516, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005).
142. See S. 5, 109th Cong. (2005); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
143. S. 5, § 9; Class Action Fairness Act § 9.
144. Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1095.
145. See id. at 1095-96.
146. Knudsen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 805, 806 (7th Cir. 2005).
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the possibility of removing an action to federal court where the
complaint was filed prior to CAFA's enactment. For instance, where
the complaint has been modified in such a way that does not "relate
back" to the original pleading, courts have held the amendment
"commenced" a new action to which CAFA therefore applied.147
For example, in Plummer v. Farmers Group, Inc. ,148 the plaintiff
originally filed suit on October 7, 2002, alleging that the defendant,
an insurance company, undervalued the plaintiffs loss when
evaluating a claim pursuant to his insurance policy after a car
collision. 149  On May 23, 2005, the plaintiff filed an amended
petition in state court alleging that the defendant potentially
undervalued thousands of additional claimants' automobiles. 150 The
amended petition added: "(1) thousands of new parties to the suit (all
plaintiffs); (2) a fraud cause of action; (3) a bad faith cause of action;
and (4) a request for certification of the matter as a class action."
15 1
The court held that filing the amended complaint was de facto
commencement of a new suit for purposes of determining CAFA's
applicability.
152
The court noted that "there is a significant body of law that
suggests that an amended complaint or petition is tantamount to
commencing a new cause of action in certain circumstances."
153
Specifically, the court found that filing an amended complaint may
147. See, e.g., Heaphy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C05 5404RBL,
2005 WL 1950244, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2005) (holding that adding a
new plaintiff to the complaint commences a new action unless: "(1) [there is]
adequate notice of the new claims[;] (2) [there is] an identity of interest
between the original plaintiff and the new plaintiff; and (3) relation back does
not unfairly prejudice the defendant") (citing Immigration Assistance Project,
L.A. County Fed'n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002)); Plummer v.
Farmers Group, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1316 (E.D. Okla. 2005) (holding
that a drastic modification of a complaint commenced a new action when it
added a class action not present in the case before the passage of CAFA);
Senterfitt v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1381 (S.D. Ga.
2005) (holding that amending the complaint to expand the class of plaintiffs
did not relate back to the time of the original complaint and, therefore, that it
commenced a new action for purposes of CAFA).
148. 388 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (E.D. Okla. 2005).
149. Id. at 1312.
150. Id. at 1312 13.
151. Id. at 1313.
152. Id. at 1316.
153. Id. at 1314.
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constitute a new action, unless the amended complaint "relates back"
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
154
Rule 15(c) provides that an amendment of a pleading can only
relate back to the date of the original pleading: (1) when permitted by
the applicable statute of limitations; or (2) when the new claim or
defense arises from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.
155
Unless at least one of these conditions is met, an amendment
commences a new action. An amendment post-CAFA may therefore
suffice to make an action removable, even though the original
complaint was filed prior to CAFA's enactment.
2. Burden of Proof
Traditionally, upon a motion to remand, the burden of
establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction is on the party seeking
removal, and courts will strictly construe removal statutes against
removal jurisdiction. 156 A circuit split has developed, however, with
respect to cases removed pursuant to CAFA.
157
CAFA's legislative record clearly imparts an intent to shift the
burden to the party opposing removal. The Committee Report states
that "[i]t is the Committee's intention with regard to each of these
exceptions that the party opposing federal jurisdiction shall have the
burden of demonstrating the applicability of an exemption."
158
Despite this language in the Committee Report, nowhere does the
statute's text speak of a burden shift. 159 Because CAFA makes no
such provision, certain courts have refused to shift the burden of
proof to plaintiffs. 60 There is currently a circuit split as some courts
154. Id.
155. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c).
156. Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999); In
re Expedia Hotel Taxes & Fees Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 904, 905 (W.D. Wash.
2005).
157. See infra note 161.
158. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 44 (2005) as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
41.
159. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
160. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Comcast, No. Civ.A. 05-2340, 2005 WL
1799414, at *4 (E.D. Penn. July 28, 2005); In re Expedia Hotel Taxes & Fees
Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 904, 905 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Sneddon v. Hotwire, Inc.,
No. C05-0951 SI, C05-0952 SI, C05-0953 SI, 2005 WL 1593593, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. June 29, 2005).
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have relied solely on legislative intent while others have relied on the
statute's text in conjunction with past removal precedent.
1 6'
Accordingly, those jurisdictions that have placed an emphasis on
congressional intent tend to hold that the plaintiff has the burden of
showing why remand is appropriate, while those jurisdictions that
look only to the statute's text tend to find that the burden remains
with the moving party. 162 This type of distinction-based on the
judge's or justice's personal theory of interpretation-results in a
significant opportunity for inconsistent rulings.
In Schwartz, Judge O'Neill of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that the burden remained with the defendants to
demonstrate that federal jurisdiction is proper, noting "I am guided
by Justice Jackson's concurrence in Schwegmann Bros.: 'Resort to
legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is
inescapably ambiguous.' 163  He found that where-as with
CAFA-"'the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, further
inquiry is not required, except in the extraordinary case where a
literal reading of the language produces an absurd result."' 
164
Unsurprisingly, Judge O'Neill applied past precedent with respect to
burden of proof, requiring the defendants to demonstrate the
appropriateness of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
165
In the Central District of California, however, Judge Stotler held
to the contrary in Berry v. American Express Publishing Corp. 166
The plaintiffs in that case argued that the "failure to incorporate [the]
directive on the burden of proof into the statute evinces an explicit
intent to maintain the status quo."' 167 Judge Stotler held that "this
contention cannot be squared with the uncontradicted statements
161. See, e.g., Yescavage v. Wyeth, No. 205CV294FTM335PC, 2005 WL
2088429, at * 1-2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2005); Berry v. American Express Pub.
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122 23 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Contra Schwartz,
2005 WL 1799414, at *4; In re Expedia Hotel, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 905;
Sneddon, 2005 WL 1593593, at *1.
162. See supra note 161.
163. Schwartz, 2005 WL 1799414, at *6 (quoting Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-96 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
164. Id. (quoting Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197,
202 (3d Cir. 1998)).
165. Id.
166. 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
167. Id. at 1122.
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contained in the Committee Report [evincing a clear intention to shift
the burden of proof]" and, therefore, shifted the burden of proof to
the plaintiffs to show why remand was appropriate. 168
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc.169 suggests that Judge O'Neil's reading of
the statute is the appropriate one. In discussing traditional rules of
statutory interpretation, the Court noted:
As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is
the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other
extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in
statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a
reliable light on the enacting Legislature's understanding of
otherwise ambiguous terms. Not all extrinsic materials are
reliable sources of insight into legislative understandings,
however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable
to two serious criticisms. First, legislative history is itself
often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory .... Second,
judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee
reports, which are not themselves subject to the
requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative
committee members-or, worse yet, unelected staffers and
lobbyists-both the power and the incentive to attempt
strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure
results they were unable to achieve through the statutory
text. We need not comment here on whether these
problems are sufficiently prevalent to render legislative
history inherently unreliable in all circumstances, a point on
which Members of this Court have disagreed. 
170
Because there is no "ambiguous" term in CAFA regarding the
burden of proof (there is no mention of burden of proof at all), 171 the
Exxon court's rule of statutory construction demands that a court not
use the Senate Judiciary Committee Report to interpret CAFA's
meaning.
168. Id.
169. 125 S. Ct. 2611(2005).
170. Id. at 2626.
171. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, the use of the Senate Judiciary Committee Report
is problematic because subsequent legislative history is a
questionable source of legislative intent, 172 and the report was filed
after CAFA's enactment. The Senate passed CAFA on February 10,
2005, but the Judiciary Committee did not file its report until
February 28, 2005.173 This timing raises constitutional issues
because neither Congress nor the President passes upon or enacts
into law the language used by a committee in a post-legislative
report.1
74
Which party carries the burden of proof is often dispositive of
the outcome, and, furthermore, it helps a district court insulate itself
from reversal. For these reasons, the issue requires speedy
resolution, either by Supreme Court decision or congressional
amendment.
3. Discovery Issues That Have Arisen as "Side Effects" of CAFA
In determining proper federal subject matter jurisdiction, the
threshold issue is whether a class action meets the diversity
jurisdiction requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 175 But
even if these requirements are met, jurisdiction is not automatic. A
series of provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) spell out three
categories into which a class action may fall: (1) mandatory federal
jurisdiction; (2) prohibited federal jurisdiction; or (3) discretionary
federal jurisdiction. 176 The category into which a case falls depends
on the fraction of class members and the fraction of certain
defendants in the forum state.'
77
For example, under the "home state controversy" exception,
district courts must decline to exercise jurisdiction where two-thirds
or more of the members of the proposed plaintiff class, and the
172. See Blanchett v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974)
("[P]ost-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to
change legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act's passage.").
173. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 1 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3,3.
174. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAN. L. REV. 1457, 1521 22 (2000).
175. For more detailed analysis of these provisions, see infra Part 111.
176. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
177. Id.
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primary defendants, are citizens of the original filing state. 7 8 Under
the "local controversy" exception, district courts must decline
jurisdiction where four circumstances are met: (1) greater than two-
thirds of the members of the proposed plaintiff class are citizens of
the original filing state; (2) at least one defendant is a defendant from
whom members of the proposed plaintiff class seek significant relief,
whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis of the asserted
claims, and who is a citizen of the original filing state; (3) the
principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct of each
defendant were incurred in the original filing state; and (4) no other
class action asserting the same or similar factual allegations has been
filed against any of the defendants within three years preceding the
filing of the instant class action.'
79
These provisions are dependent on issues of fact because they
require discovering each party's citizenship. This fact-specific
inquiry has raised unanticipated discovery issues. At least one court
has allowed the parties to engage in limited discovery with respect to
the jurisdictional question. In Schwartz v. Comcast,180 the plaintiffs
brought suit against the defendant corporation for breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, and violation of Pennsylvania's Consumer
protection law, alleging that the defendant failed to provide high
speed internet service to various customers despite making promises
to do so. 81 After the defendant removed the action, the plaintiffs
moved to remand. 182 The parties agreed that CAFA's numerosity
and amount in controversy requirements were met in the case.
1 83
The plaintiffs argued that remand was nonetheless proper because
the class definition in the amended complaint fell within both the
"home state controversy" and the "local controversy" exceptions. 1
84
In the complaint, the plaintiffs defined the class as all persons or
entities residing or doing business in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania who subscribed to Comcast's high-speed internet
service during the relevant time period.185 Because being a citizen of
178. See § 1332(d)(4)(B).
179. See § 1332(d)(4)(A).
180. No. CIV.A. 05-2340, 2005 WL 1799414 (E.D. Penn. July 28, 2005).
181. Id. at*1.
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at *1. After defendants removed, the plaintiffs amended the
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Pennsylvania is not a qualification for class membership under this
definition, the court observed that "[h]ypothetically speaking, there
may be numerous members of the proposed class who are citizens of
different states but who resided or did business in Pennsylvania and
subscribed to Comcast's high-speed internet service during the
relevant time period."'1 86 In order to determine the appropriateness of
federal subject matter jurisdiction, each class member's residency
requires resolution.
The court concluded that because the defendant had control over
the information that would establish the citizenship of the various
members of the plaintiff's proposed class, it would allow the parties
to engage in limited discovery. 187 In arriving at this conclusion, the
court followed precedent regarding jurisdictional discovery, which
provides that it should be allowed unless the plaintiffs' claim is
"clearly frivolous." 188 The court held that the plaintiffs' claim was
not clearly frivolous and discovery was necessary to determine
whether jurisdiction was proper. 89
In future cases, attorneys will likely anticipate jurisdictional
issues and clearly define the class from the outset in such a way that
demands either the "home controversy" or "local controversy"
exception.
190
complaint to include all persons and entities who are citizens of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who resided or did business in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and who subscribed to Comcast's high-speed
internet service during the relevant time period. Id. The court observed that,
under the amended complaint, it is clear that all class members are citizens of
Pennsylvania and thus, more than two-thirds of the class members are citizens
of Pennsylvania and not diverse from Comcast. Id. at *2. In this scenario, the
class definition would clearly preclude diversity under the "home state
controversy" and "local controversy" exceptions. Id. However, the court
concluded that it could not rest upon the allegations of an amended complaint
after the defendant had filed notice of removal. Id. at *3 ("Generally speaking,
the nature of plaintiffs claim must be evaluated, and the propriety of remand
decided, on the basis of the record as it stands at the time the petition for
removal is filed." (citing Westmoreland Hosp. Ass'n v. Blue Cross of W. Pa.,
605 F.2d 119, 123 (3rd Cir. 1979)) (emphasis added)).
186. Id. at *3.
187. Id. at *7.
188. See id. at *7 n.ll (quoting Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am.
Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997)).
189. Id; see also Fredman, supra note 65.
190. For example, including forum state citizenship as a requirement of class
membership. See discussion of amended complaint supra note 92.
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4. Possibility to Remove Pursuant to
§ 1453 Even Where § 1332(d) Is Not Met
A close reading of CAFA's text suggests that, even where a
class action does not meet the CAFA-enacted diversity requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), a defendant may still remove the case
pursuant to CAFA-enacted § 1453 if it meets any of the other
traditional bases of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 191 Over most
of the six years that the legislature debated CAFA, the possibly of a
class action meeting traditional federal subject matter jurisdiction
requirements, but not CAFA-enacted federal subject matter
requirements, seemed rare due to the difficulty in asserting federal
jurisdiction under the traditional standards.192 But since the Supreme
Court's ruling in Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Services,
93
which gave an expansive interpretation to 28 U.S.C. § 1367
supplemental jurisdiction, 194 the possibility now seems more likely.
Prior to § 1367's enactment, the Supreme Court held in Zahn v.
International Paper Co. 195 that each class member must individually
meet the amount-in-controversy requirement for a federal court to
assert jurisdiction.' 96 The court in Allapattah, however, held that
Congress' enactment of § 1367 overruled Zahn.1 97 According to
Allapattah, where at least one named plaintiff in the action satisfies
the amount-in-controversy requirement, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 "does
authorize supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of other plaintiffs
in the same ... case or controversy, even if those claims are for less
than the jurisdictional amount specified in the statute setting forth
requirements for diversity jurisdiction." 198  The court specifically
noted that CAFA had no bearing on its analysis, 99 and, thus, it is
possible for cases to meet supplemental jurisdiction requirements
without meeting CAFA's diversity jurisdiction requirements.
20 0
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006).
192. See discussion supra Part B.
193. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
194. See id. at 2632 ("The Court adopts a plausibly broad reading of
§ 1367.") (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
196. Id. at 302.
197. Allatapah, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2625 (2005).
198. Id. at 2615.
199. Id. at 2627.
200. Of course supplemental jurisdiction is not the only scenario by which
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If this scenario does occur, the statute's text suggests that parties
may remove class actions pursuant to CAFA-enacted § 1453 despite
the failure to meet the all the substantive requirements of CAFA-
enacted § 1332(d). Subsection (a) of the removal statute instructs
that the statute applies to class actions as defined in § 1332(d)(1):
"any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure
authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative
persons as a class action. '2° 1  The substantive CAFA diversity
jurisdiction requirements-partial diversity, $5,000,000 in contro-
versy, and a one-hundred-member class-are not enumerated until §
1332(d)(2) and (d)(5), and thus, have no bearing on the definition of
"class action." Consequently, § 1453 applies equally to a class
action removed pursuant to § 1332(d) or pursuant to a traditional
basis of federal jurisdiction.
E. Conclusion
Despite particular drafting errors, omissions, and ambiguities,
CAFA accomplishes its primary goal of expanding federal subject
matter jurisdiction over class actions. It is easier for plaintiffs to file
class actions in federal court, and it is easier for defendants to
remove class actions to federal court. What remains to be seen is
whether this achieves the fairness and consistency that CAFA's
drafters hoped would result. Because CAFA did not affect the Erie
doctrine, 202 federal courts will still apply state substantive law,
varying dramatically among states. 203 Furthermore, wide variation
occurs within and among federal courts, as is evinced by the opposite
rulings regarding which party carries the burden of proof to establish
federal jurisdiction. Nonetheless, concerns over ambiguities and
other technical issues will likely be resolved through litigation, and,
thus, ultimately pose little threat to the statute's effectiveness in
expanding federal court jurisdiction over class actions.
class actions might come under non-CAFA federal subject matter jurisdiction;
it is also possible for a class action to meet either traditional diversity
requirements or federal question requirements without meeting CAFA-enacted
requirements. This discussion is applicable to those scenarios as well.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B) (2006).
202. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 49 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
46.
203. See SECTION OF LITIG., AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 18.
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